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“When Oversight Itself Becomes a Risk to the Rule of Law”

Opinion | By Tico Vos December 30, 2025

 

If SOAB Could Be Used This Way — Who Else Is Being Used?

A question Curaçao can no longer afford to ignore

The recent findings of the Algemene Rekenkamer on the role of SOAB have raised an uncomfortable but necessary question:

If this could happen at SOAB, how many other government-linked entities are being used in the same way?

Not by accident. Not through simple error. But through a system that allows public institutions to drift outside democratic control — quietly, legally, and with minimal scrutiny.

A Dangerous Precedent

SOAB was never meant to be an operational arm of government policy. Its purpose is clear: independent control, financial integrity, and protection of public funds.

Yet the Rekenkamer now confirms what many suspected:

                       SOAB performed tasks beyond its legal mandate

                       Procedures were followed without proper legal grounding

                       Oversight mechanisms failed

                       Parliamentary control was effectively bypassed

This is not a technical problem. This is a governance problem. And it forces us to ask a deeper question:

If SOAB — an institution designed to guard legality — could be used this way, what about other foundations and government-linked entities?

The Structural Risk Nobody Wants to Name

Curaçao has built a system filled with:

                       foundations

                       government-owned companies

                       semi-autonomous agencies

                       project entities

                       temporary task forces

Many of them are formally independent, but politically dependent.

They receive:

                       public money

                       public mandates

                       public trust

Yet often operate:

                       outside parliamentary budget control

                       without public tendering

                       with limited transparency

                       under boards appointed through political channels

This creates a dangerous grey zone — one where legality exists on paper, but accountability fades in practice.

Incompetence or Convenience?

The common defense is familiar:

“The ministry lacked capacity.”

“We needed expertise quickly.”

“The system is too slow.”

But this raises a painful question:

If ministers and top officials cannot perform their core duties without outsourcing governance itself, why are they in those positions?

When external entities begin to:

                       design policy

                       execute policy

                       control finances

                       and report on themselves

then the state has effectively outsourced its own responsibility.

That is not reform.

That is abdication.

The Real Problem: Parliamentary Bypass

The most troubling aspect is not financial.

It is constitutional.

Parliament controls the budget.

Parliament represents the people.

Parliament is supposed to be the final gatekeeper.

But when funds are routed through:

                       foundations

                       agencies

                       special projects

                       or “temporary constructions”

Parliament sees only the surface — not the mechanisms underneath. This is how democratic control erodes without a single law being changed.

Was This Malice?

That is not the only question. A more important one is:

Why did no one stop it?

Why were warning signs ignored?

Why were legal boundaries stretched?

Why did oversight bodies not intervene earlier?

Why did Parliament learn only afterward?

A democracy does not fail only through corruption.

It also fails through silence, convenience, and normalized exceptions.

The Question That Must Now Be Asked

If SOAB could operate beyond its mandate…

Which other institutions are doing the same?

                       Which foundations?

                       Which state-owned companies?

                       Which “temporary” constructions?

                       Which boards operating without public scrutiny?

And most importantly:

Who benefits from keeping this system opaque?

What Must Happen Now

            1.         Full transparency of all government-linked foundations and entities

            2.         Public disclosure of mandates, budgets, and decision lines

            3.         Clear separation between policy, execution, and control

            4.         Parliamentary review of all entities operating with public funds

            5.         Reinforcement of competence requirements for leadership roles

Without this, Curaçao risks normalizing a shadow system of governance — one that functions beside democracy instead of within it.

Final Thought

This is not an attack on individuals. It is a warning about a system. Because when oversight bodies become operators, when consultants replace accountability, and when Parliament is informed after the fact, then the question is no longer:

“Was the law followed?”

But:

“Who is really governing this country?”

That is the question Curaçao must now have the courage to ask.

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