WILLEMSTAD – The controversy surrounding the role of the Stichting Overheidsaccountantsbureau (SOAB), the Government’s Accountant Bureau, deepens as a second legal analysis by former Audit Chamber auditor drs. Luigi A. Faneyte concludes that the work carried out by SOAB in 2023 is not only inconsistent with the 2015 Landsverordening, but also incompatible with SOAB’s most recent statutes adopted on 15 August 2024.
In his new contribution, Faneyte shifts the focus from statutory law to the organization’s updated internal statutes, which were broadened in scope last year. Even under this expanded framework, he argues, the assignments described by the Algemene Rekenkamer Curaçao (ARC) in its report on the 2023 national accounts remain legally indefensible.
The analysis responds to the question of whether the tasks performed by SOAB, as identified by the ARC, can be reconciled with the 2024 statutes. Faneyte’s answer is again clear: no. While the statutes allow for advisory, supportive and audit-related activities, they do not authorize SOAB to take on executive or operational roles in government projects.
According to the statutes, SOAB’s mission centers on auditing, assurance and advisory services, as well as providing financial, administrative and organizational support to government entities. However, Faneyte emphasizes that these provisions must be interpreted within the role of an independent expert. The statutes do not designate SOAB as an implementing body, nor do they grant authority for direct financial management, project execution or operational control.
The ARC’s findings, however, indicate that SOAB was involved in managing project funds, executing administrative processes, monitoring projects and strengthening operational capacity within ministries. These activities, Faneyte argues, are inherently executive in nature and form part of day-to-day financial management. As such, they conflict with both the advisory character of SOAB’s statutory role and fundamental principles of role separation.
A key element in Faneyte’s reasoning is that broader statutory language does not equate to unlimited authority. Even where the statutes use terms such as “support” and “assistance,” these cannot be stretched to cover hands-on budget management or project administration. Doing so would place SOAB in a position where it could later be required to audit or assess activities in which it was directly involved, undermining its independence.
Faneyte also stresses the hierarchy of legal norms. The statutes of SOAB are private-law instruments and cannot override or legitimize conduct that conflicts with public financial law. The ARC explicitly concluded that the assignments in question were in violation of the Landsverordening Financieel Beheer. In such cases, statutes cannot cure illegality or create lawful authority where statutory law does not permit it.
Even if one were to assume, hypothetically, that the statutes allowed such activities, Faneyte argues that they would still be invalid if they clash with binding public law. This, he notes, aligns with the ARC’s recommendation that assignments to SOAB must always be tested against both statutory law and the organization’s stated objectives.
In his final assessment, Faneyte concludes that the work carried out by SOAB, as described by the ARC, exceeds the organization’s statutory role as an independent adviser and auditor. The assignments are executive and managerial in nature, conflict with higher-ranking public financial legislation, and cannot be justified by reference to the 2024 statutes.
With this second analysis, Faneyte reinforces the legal pressure on both SOAB and the government to clarify institutional boundaries. The debate, once technical, has now evolved into a broader question about governance, accountability and the integrity of Curaçao’s financial oversight system.
