WILLEMSTAD - An extensive legal analysis submitted to Curaçao Chronicle raises serious questions about whether the Government Accounting Bureau (SOAB) has acted within its legal and statutory mandate when carrying out a range of additional operational tasks for government projects. The opinion piece, written by financial and legal expert Luigi A. Faneyte, forms part of a six-part series examining the legitimacy of extra work performed by SOAB in light of existing laws and regulations.
At the heart of the analysis is a fundamental legal question: can provisions from the Civil Code of Curaçao and the National Ordinance on Financial Management be used to legitimize activities carried out by SOAB that go beyond its core role as an internal audit and control body? According to the author, the answer is clearly no.
The opinion focuses on whether articles 13 and 50 of the Civil Code of Curaçao, together with articles 9 and 17 of the National Ordinance on Financial Management, can serve as a legal basis for activities such as project fund management, administrative and organizational execution, the processing of payments, project monitoring and the effective strengthening of capacity within ministries. These are activities that, according to the analysis, do not clearly fall within SOAB’s statutory mandate as defined in the relevant national ordinances and in SOAB’s own statutes.
Faneyte argues that the core issue is not whether these activities are practical or useful, but whether SOAB has the legal authority to perform them. In public law, usefulness does not create competence. Authority must be explicitly grounded in law, statutes or a properly constructed formal mandate.
With regard to article 13 of the Civil Code, which addresses the prohibition of abuse of rights, the analysis notes that this provision presupposes the existence of a lawful competence. It can be used to prevent the misuse of an existing right, but it cannot be invoked to create a new authority where none exists. If SOAB lacks the statutory or legal basis to perform certain tasks, article 13 cannot be used to fill that gap.
The same reasoning applies to article 50 of the Civil Code, which regulates the functioning of legal entities such as foundations. While this article governs how powers are exercised within an organization, it does not expand those powers beyond the entity’s stated objectives. A foundation may only act within the scope of its statutory purpose. Actions outside that purpose are considered ultra vires and may be legally challenged. According to the analysis, article 50 therefore cannot be used to justify the assumption of additional government execution tasks by SOAB.
The opinion piece then turns to the National Ordinance on Financial Management, particularly articles 9 and 17. These provisions regulate the organization of financial management, accountability and oversight within government. Faneyte stresses that these articles are primarily directed at ministries and government bodies themselves, not automatically at SOAB. While they require the government to ensure sound financial management, they do not designate SOAB as an executing body for financial or project management tasks. To confer such authority, an explicit legal designation, statutory basis or formal mandate is required.
The analysis also responds to public statements attributed to SOAB, including arguments that fund management and administrative execution are a necessary part of effective project support. Faneyte characterizes this as a functional or pragmatic line of reasoning that does not hold up legally. In law, necessity or efficiency cannot replace formal authority. Without a legal basis, activities remain unauthorized regardless of their perceived usefulness.
A key concern raised in the opinion is the blurring of roles between control and execution. SOAB is designated as an internal audit and control body, a function that depends on independence and distance from execution. When the same organization manages funds, executes payments, oversees projects and later audits those activities, a situation of self-control arises. According to the analysis, this undermines independence, weakens the quality of oversight and damages the system of public accountability. In sound governance models, control and execution are deliberately kept separate for precisely this reason.
The opinion outlines what would be required to legitimize the contested activities. This would include explicit authorization in SOAB’s statutes, a clear legal expansion of its mandate through legislation, properly structured formal assignments from the government, and robust safeguards ensuring functional separation and independent oversight. In the absence of these elements, the activities remain legally vulnerable.
In its final conclusion, the analysis is unequivocal. General civil-law principles and financial management norms may provide supporting context, but they cannot replace missing statutory or legal authority. Where activities fall outside SOAB’s designation as an internal control body and outside its statutory objectives, they remain legally questionable.
The series of opinion pieces adds a new layer to the ongoing public debate about governance, financial oversight and institutional roles in Curaçao. As discussions continue about transparency and accountability in public administration, the legal boundaries of key institutions such as SOAB are likely to remain under close scrutiny.
